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Abstract 
Ownership has a unique and privileged influence on human psychology. Typically developing (TD) 
children judge their objects to be more desirable and valuable than similar objects belonging to others. 
This ‘ownership effect’ is due to processing one’s property in relation to ‘the self’. Here we explore 
whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) – a population with impaired self-
understanding – prefer and over-value property due to ownership. In Experiment 1, we discovered 
that children with ASD did not favour a randomly endowed toy and frequently traded for a different 
object. By contrast, TD children showed a clear preference for their randomly endowed toy and traded 
infrequently. Both populations also demonstrated highly-accurate tracking of owner-object 
relationships. Experiment 2 showed that both TD children and children with ASD over-value their 
toys if they are self-selected and different from other-owned toys. Unlike TD children, children with 
ASD did not over-value their toys in comparison to non-owned identical copies. This finding was 
replicated in Experiment 3, which also established that mere ownership elicited over-valuation of 
randomly endowed property in TD children. However, children with ASD did not consistently regard 
their randomly endowed toys as the most valuable, and evaluated property irrespective of ownership. 
Our findings show that mere ownership increases preferences and valuations for self-owned property 
in TD children, but not children with ASD. We propose that deficits in self-understanding may 
diminish ownership effects in ASD, eliciting a more economically-rational strategy that prioritises 
material qualities (e.g. what a toy is) rather than whom it belongs to. 
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Mine is better than yours: Investigating the ownership effect in children with autism spectrum 
disorder and typically developing children. 
1. Introduction 
Ownership is a vital cornerstone of human culture (Brown, 1991). Determining ‘who owns 
what’ is fundamental to myriad social behaviours, ranging from playground disputes to international 
political decisions (Bloom & Gelman, 2008; Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; Kalish & Anderson, 
2011). Ownership also has a unique and privileged influence on human psychology. We feel deeply 
connected to our possessions, and there is an undeniable relationship between the property we own 
and our sense of identity (Belk, 1985, 1991, 2000; Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; James, 1890; Rochat, 
2010). Across disciplines, it is argued that property is psychologically influential because establishing 
ownership causes items to be processed in relation to the ‘psychological self’ (Belk, 1988; 
Csikzentimihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; Hood, Weltzien, Marsh, & 
Kanngiesser, 2016; Satre, 1956). Thus, ownership understanding may be atypical when the 
psychological self is impaired. The purpose of the present study is to investigate how Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) – a neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by an impaired 
psychological sense of self (Frith, 2003; Grisdale, Lind, Eacott, & Williams, 2014; Lind, 2010; 
Williams, 2010; Uddin, 2011) – impacts the cognitive bias towards self-owned property and 
evaluations of property owned by others. 
Owing to its cultural and psychological salience, ownership understanding normally emerges 
in early childhood. By 2 years, typically developing (TD) children refer to objects using possessive 
pronouns (e.g. “mine”, “yours”) and are able to infer owner-object relationships independent of 
physical possession (Fasig, 2000; Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary, 2013; Saylor, 
Ganea, & Vázquez, 2010). By 3-4 years, ownership can be inferred based on a range of heuristics 
including verbal testimony, first possession, stereotypes, and historical reasoning (Nancekivell, Van 
de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013). Coinciding with this developing knowledge, TD toddlers 
frequently engage in heated disputes over property access (Hay & Ross, 1982) and subjectively 
evaluate objects based on historical connections to themselves or other people. In particular, TD 
children show a ‘mere ownership effect’ – increased valuation and preference for objects simply 
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because they are owned – by 2-5 years (Gelman et al., 2012; Hood & Bloom, 2008; Hood et al., 2016; 
Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2001).  
It is widely agreed that TD children form strong emotional attachments to their property 
(Winnicott, 1969). Hood and Bloom (2008) found that TD children aged 3 to 6 years were reluctant to 
let an experimenter “make” an identical copy of a cherished possession, and almost all preferred their 
authentic objects over replicas. When asked why they preferred the authentic object over the copy, 
they frequently responded “because it’s mine”. Other studies show that TD children form attachments 
to property after only brief periods of ownership. Employing a classic resource exchange paradigm, 
Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund (2001) gave participants aged 5, 10 and 20 years a gift to keep, and 
then asked if they wished to trade it for an alternative of similar value. Across different pairs of goods, 
participants were 1.9 to 2.9 times more likely to keep the item they were initially assigned and this 
effect did not differ with age.  Thus, the preference for self-owned property develops in early 
childhood and endures into adulthood (for replications of this phenomenon, see Beggan, 1992; 
Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Knetsch, 1989; Reb 
& Connoly, 2007; Thaler, 1980). Gelman and colleagues (2012) recently found that simply stipulating 
an ownership relation is sufficient to elicit a preference for novel objects in children as young as 2 
years. Remarkably, a reliable preference for self-owned objects was observed even when those objects 
were relatively unappealing or identical to comparison objects (also see Hood et al., 2016). Taken 
together, these findings unambiguously demonstrate that ownership “… confers special value, above 
and beyond an object’s material or functional properties” (Gelman et al., 2012, p. 1733).  
The cognitive bias for one’s own property is attributed to our regarding of objects as 
extensions of the self (Belk, 2000; Csikszentimihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Diesendruck & 
Perez, 2015; Morewedge & Giblin, 2015; Sartre, 1956; Winnicott, 1953). The ‘extended-self 
hypothesis’ posits that an individual’s self-concept incorporates property items – both material (e.g. 
cherished possessions) and immaterial (e.g. hobbies and interests) – that represent their personal 
identity (Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992; James, 1890). At a psychological level, ownership constitutes an 
autobiographical attachment between an object and the self that is maintained over time. Once this 
attachment is forged, the object may be integrated into a person’s extended self-concept and, in turn, 
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an abstract trace of the self may transfer to the object through ‘contamination’ (Argo, Dahl, & 
Morales, 2008). This mentalistic connection to property explains why self-owned possessions are 
more memorable, desirable, and judged to be more valuable than similar non-owned items 
(Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2013; Gelman et al., 2012; Gelman, Frazier, Noles, 
Manczak, & Stilwell, 2015; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). From a developmental perspective, 
children’s concept of ownership is thought to arise from extending their sense of self to objects 
(Humphrey, 1992; Rochat, 2010). Indeed, Diesendruck and Perez (2015) recently demonstrated that 
TD children treat owned objects as extensions of the self by 5 years. 
Knowing that you own an object is contingent on forming and retaining an invisible, socially 
meaningful, association with the self. This knowledge demands an awareness of the self as continuous 
in time (in conjunction with the object) and an understanding of ownership as a social construct 
(Fasig, 2000). However, many children with ASD experience impaired awareness of the 
psychological self (Frith, 2003; Lind, 2010). It is well-documented that individuals with ASD have 
difficulty using first person pronouns (e.g “I” and “me”; Jordan, 1996; Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994; 
Lind & Bowler, 2009), and have diminished awareness of their emotions and mental states (e.g. Ben 
Shalom et al., 2006; Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004; Silani et al., 2008; Williams & Happé, 2010). These 
children also show impaired memory for personally experienced events and impoverished knowledge 
of personal facts (e.g. Bruck, London, Landa, & Goodman, 2007; Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, & 
Patel, 2007). These findings indicate that the self does not provide a robust organising structure within 
the memory of children with ASD, reducing their ability tag information as self-relevant and 
inhibiting their development of an extended self-concept (Lind, 2010). These deficits may diminish 
children’s preference for self- (vs. other-) owned objects, potentially nullifying the mere ownership 
effect.  
As ownership knowledge is acquired from one’s culture via interactions with others 
(Kanngiesser, Rossano, & Tomasello, 2015; Sparks, Cunningham, & Kritikos, 2016), diagnosis-
defining deficits in social-cognition may also hinder developmental understanding of this convention 
(e.g. Bushwick, 2001). It is well documented that children with ASD experience difficulties 
interacting with others and show reduced social motivation (APA, 2013; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, 
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Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). Compared with TD children, those with ASD spend less time engaged in 
social interactions with peers (Bauminger et al., 2008), are less likely to collaborate (Aldridge et al., 
2000; Carpenter et al., 2001; van Ommeren, Begeer, Scheeren, & Koot, 2012), and are less likely to 
reciprocate in naturalistic interactions (Channon et al., 2001; Hadwin et al., 1997; Wimpory et al., 
2007; Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Klin et al., 2006; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). It is also widely 
acknowledged that children with ASD have fundamental impairments in Theory of Mind (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). As a result of these difficulties, children with ASD may have 
increased difficulty tracking, and mentally representing, invisible relationships between owners and 
their property.  
To date, a single adult study has investigated the impact of ASD on ownership-related 
cognition. Grisdale and colleagues (Grisdale et al., 2014) asked adults with autism and neurotypical 
controls matched on verbal ability, non-verbal functioning, and chronological age to sort pictures into 
two baskets: one belonging to the participant, and one belonging to experimenter. Participants’ 
memory for the pictures was then tested via a surprise recognition task. While the TD adults 
demonstrated significantly more accurate recall for pictures belonging to them than the experimenter, 
adults with ASD recognised self- and other-owned pictures with equivalent accuracy. This suggests 
that processing objects in relation to the self may not influence cognition in adults with ASD, as it 
does for TD counterparts. Crucially, however, no prior research has investigated how ASD impacts 
ownership understanding or related effects in children. Therefore, an important and highly novel goal 
of this research is to establish whether the influence of ownership on property preferences and 
valuations is atypical in children with ASD. 
For the first time, the present study examined whether children with ASD display mere 
ownership effects. In Experiment 1 we investigate whether mere ownership influences preferential 
biases towards objects, plus the ability to track owner-object relationships, via a resource trading 
paradigm. Children with ASD and TD controls were randomly assigned a gift to keep, before being 
offered the chance to trade for one of two alternatives (the remaining gifts were taken by the 
experimenter and a confederate). Over several trials, we recorded how frequently children traded, and 
how accurately they tracked owner-object relationships. We predicted that mere ownership of gifts 
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would not confer immaterial value for children with ASD due to impairments encoding information in 
relation to the self (Lind, 2010). Thus, we expected them to trade significantly more frequently than 
TD controls, who we expected to show a strong preference for the initially endowed gift (Harbaugh et 
al., 2001). We also anticipated that impairments in social interaction in ASD (APA, 2013) may reduce 
children’s ability to accurately track owner-object relationships.  
In Experiments 2 and 3 we explore how children with ASD and TD controls value self- and 
other-owned property. In particular, we test whether these populations consider their toys to be more 
desirable than toys belonging to others. We also assess whether children ascribe higher value to their 
toys than identical copies, and probe their willingness to trade for these copies. Crucially, the results 
of this study will advance the ownership literature by providing new insight into how fundamental 
attitudes to property are impacted by ASD (a highly prevalent neurodevelopmental disorder that 
affects 1 in 100 children; Baird et al., 2006).  
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 18 children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (16 male; M age = 8.9 years, 
range = 6.1–11.1 years) and 18 TD children (12 male; M age = 4.3 years, range = 3–6.1 years) 
recruited from two specialist schools and one mainstream school in the Cheshire area. Samples were 
closely matched on receptive vocabulary as measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; 
ASD: M age equivalent: 4.82 years, SD: 1.6; TD: M age equivalent: 4.83 years, SD: 1.34; Dunn, 
Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997). All children with ASD were diagnosed by a qualified educational or 
clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and 
Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 2002; Lord, Rutter & Le 
Couteur, 1994) and expert judgement. Diagnoses were confirmed via the Childhood Autism Rating 
Scale (CARS; Schopler, Reichler, DeVellis, & Daly, 1980), which was completed by each 
participant’s class teacher (ASD: M score = 31.78; TD: M score = 15.22). Children with ASD were 
significantly older (t(34) = 13.92, p < .001, d = 4.78), and had significantly higher CARS scores (t(34) 
= 8.28, p < .001, d = 2.84) than the TD children. The study was approved by the University Ethics 
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Committee, and informed consent was obtained from children’s caregivers prior to their involvement 
in the research. 
2.1.2. Materials 
Stimuli for the trading game included 9 toys divided into 3 sets of 3 based on similarity of 
size, complexity, and attractiveness (see Figure 1). By including 3 items in a set, the child could not 
perform at ceiling on the owner identification questions simply by tracking their own object. Each 
participant was presented with the same sets of toys, which were safe and developmental age-
appropriate. In line with previous studies of this nature, children interacted with a puppet during the 
experimental tasks (e.g. Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014). The inclusion of the puppet as a third party 
required children to discriminate between two non-owned items when answering owner identification 
questions in the trading game, reducing the likelihood of correct guessing. Two hand puppets 

































Fig. 1 Toys used in Experiments 1, 2 and 3; Sets A-C were used in Experiments 1 and 2; Sets D-F 
were used in Experiment 3 
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in their own schools and were accompanied by a familiar 
adult. Children were verbally praised for attention and good behaviour. Participants completed the 
BPVS in session one, followed by the trading game in session two on a different day. 
Children were introduced to a puppet that matched their gender (Jack or Jill). A set of 3 toys 
was placed on the table (“Look at these three toys – one, two, three”), and one was allocated to the 
child (“This toy is yours; this toy is for [child’s name]”) at random. They were informed that they 
Set A: flying frog, bouncy ball, smiley man 
Set B: paddle bat, Frisbee, recorder 
Set C: ball popper, jigsaw puzzle, maze Set F: xylophone, mini basketball, mini bowling 
Set E: troll, yoyo, bouncy face 
Set D: bird whistle, animal rubber, slinky 
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could take the toy home and keep it forever. Children were then asked whether they would like to 
swap their assigned toy for one of the two alternatives (“Would you like to swap your toy for one of 
these toys? You can swap for another toy if you like. Remember, [child’s name] can only keep one 
toy”). After the child’s response, one toy was then taken by the puppet and the other by the 
experimenter (e.g. “This toy is for Jack, it’s his. Jack is going to keep this toy”). All 3 toys were then 
placed in the middle of the table, away from their corresponding owners, and the child was asked to 
identify who owned each toy (Ownership Questions; e.g. “Which toy belongs to Jack? Which is his 
toy?”). The child was allowed to keep their toy. This procedure was repeated over 3 trials, each 
involving a different set of toys (see Figure 1). We counterbalanced the order that toy sets were 
presented, which toys in each set were assigned to each party (child, experimenter, puppet), and the 
order of ownership questions for each trial.  
2.2. Results 
Every child completed all 3 trials. Participants were assigned a trading score of 0 to 3 
corresponding to the number of trials in which they swapped their randomly assigned object for an 
alternative. An independent samples t-test showed that children with ASD traded their toy 
significantly more often (74% of trials) than TD children (33% of trials), t(34) = 4.45, p < .001, d = 
1.53 (see Figure 2). As there were 3 objects in a set, there was a 1 in 3 chance that children would be 
randomly assigned the toy they liked most. Thus, there was a 2 in 3 (0.67) chance of trading on any 
given trial. Over three trials, we would expect children to trade for their favourite toys on 2.01 trials. 
In comparison with this chance value, TD children traded significantly less frequently than expected 
by chance, t(17) = -4.72, p < .001, d = -1.11, while children with ASD traded at chance,  t(17) = 1.23, 
p = .24. Importantly, a series of chi-square goodness of fit tests confirmed that there were no 
preferential trading biases for certain toys in either the ASD group (Set A: χ2  = .33, p = .85; Set B: χ2  
= 1.33, p = .51; Set C: χ2  = 1, p = .61) or the TD group (Set A: χ2  = .33, p = .85; Set B: χ2  = 33, p = 
.85; Set C: χ2  = 3, p = .22). This finding confirms that toys in each set were equally desirable to 
children in each population. 
 Participants also scored 0-9 corresponding to the number of ownership questions they 
answered correctly. An independent samples t-test revealed that children with ASD (93.78% correct) 
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and TD children (100% correct) did not differ in their ability to track owner-object relationships, t(34) 














Fig. 2. Proportion of trials in which typically developing (TD) children and children with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) correctly identified owner-object pairings and traded their endowed object. 
Note. Error bars depict SEs.  
2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 1 investigated whether children with ASD show a preferential bias for objects due 
to mere ownership and whether they can accurately track owner-object relationships. Strikingly, we 
reported the very first evidence that children with ASD do not show the mere ownership effect 
whereas TD controls showed a clear preference for a randomly endowed gift. Thus, ownership 
conferred immaterial value to the endowed object for TD children, but not children with ASD. Both 
groups were extremely competent at identifying owner-object relationships, indicating a dissociation 
between owner identification (intact) and over-valuation of self-owned property (absent) in ASD. 
Contrary to our predictions, both TD children and children with ASD accurately tracked 
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attending to their own object (they had to discriminate between objects belonging to the experimenter 
and the puppet). As owner-object relationships were generated and unambiguously identified for 
children during the experiment (i.e. children did not need to infer historical ownership via heuristics), 
accurate recognition of owner-object relationships may have been supported by basic associative 
learning mechanisms that track statistical relationships between co-occurring stimuli across time and 
contexts (Plunkett, 1997; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). As children with ASD are competent associative 
learners (e.g.  Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Frith & Happé, 1994; Hartley & Allen, 2015; Preissler, 2008; 
Preissler & Carey, 2005), it is likely that they can effectively track visual co-occurrences between 
objects and their owners. Nevertheless, it is possible that these children may differ in their sensitivity 
to more subtle ownership cues that are not possession-based. For example, deficits in social-cognition 
may reduce children’s awareness of gender or age related cues, while impairments in referential 
language may inhibit the importance of verbal testimony. Difficulties representing the self and others 
over time and space (Lind, 2010) may also affect children’s ability to track owner-object relationships 
over longer durations. 
Excitingly, this experiment shows that mere ownership does not influence object preferences 
in children with ASD. This theoretically important finding reflects an absence of an extremely robust 
cultural phenomenon that influences both the psychology of economics and identity. It also aligns 
with Grisdale et al’s (2014) finding that adults with ASD do not show superior memory for self-
owned items relative to other-owned items.  In accord with previous evidence, the TD controls 
showed a heightened preference for objects they were randomly endowed with and traded at below-
chance rates (also see Beggan, 1992; Gawronski et al., 2007; Harbaugh et al., 2001; Knetsch, 1989; 
Reb & Connoly, 2007; Thaler, 1980). According to the extended-self hypothesis, this bias results 
from the endowed object being processed in relation to ‘the self’, which increases its psychological 
salience and perceived desirability relative to non-endowed alternatives (Belk, 2000; 
Csikszentimihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; Sartre, 1956; Winnicott, 
1953). By contrast, fundamental deficits in self-concept development may negate this bias in children 
with ASD (Bruck et al., 2007; Frith, 2001; Hill et al., 2004; Lind, 2010; Lind & Bowler, 2009). A 
reduced ability to tag objects as “self-relevant” may result in weakened psychological connections to 
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self-owned property. Consequently, the children with ASD traded objectively; as all the objects were 
of equal status, they simply selected the one they liked most.  
Although mere ownership did not confer special value to the randomly endowed toys for 
children with ASD, they might have displayed ownership-related biases for the preferred toys they 
traded for. As TD individuals, we evaluate ourselves and others based on property, and judge our 
objects to be more desirable, memorable, and valuable than similar objects belonging to others 
(Cunningham et al., 2013; Gelman et al., 2012; Kahneman et al., 1991). From 3 years of age, TD 
children consider self-owned objects to be more valuable than identical objects that do not belong to 
them (Hood & Bloom, 2008; Gelman et al., 2012). Despite there being no aesthetic or functional 
difference from an identical copy, historical connections to the self resulting from ownership make 
one’s property “authentic” and thus more valuable (Belk, 1985, 1991, 2000; Gelman et al., 2015; 
James, 1890). In Experiment 2, we explore whether children with ASD display ownership effects 
when afforded the opportunity to choose their preferred toys. 
The objectives of Experiment 2 were to (a) identify whether children with ASD consider their 
property to be more valuable than comparable property belonging to others, and (b) elucidate whether 
children with ASD consider their property to be more valuable than identical copies that do not 
belong to them. Participants were allowed to choose one of three toys (the remaining toys were 
claimed by the experimenter and a puppet) and then rated the desirability of each toy. Children then 
rated the desirability of an identical copy of their toy and were offered the opportunity to trade for the 
copy. As children could claim ownership of the toys they liked most, we predicted that both 
populations would rate their property as more valuable than property belonging to the puppet and 
experimenter. However, we expected to observe between-population differences in trading 
frequencies and ratings for the identical copies. Based on previous evidence (e.g. Hood & Bloom, 
2008; Gelman et al., 2012), we suspected that processing the originally selected toy in relation to the 
self would increase its value for TD children. As the copy had not been intentionally selected, we 
anticipated that TD children would devalue the copy in relation to the original. This prediction is 
based on Egan, Santos, and Bloom’s (2007) finding that TD 4-year-olds devalue unchosen items in 
comparison to equally-attractive items they have already chosen. Consequently, we expected that TD 
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children would trade for the copy very infrequently. By contrast, given the results of Experiment 1, 
we suspected that children with ASD would regard the copies more favourably and adopt a “why not” 
attitude to trading. Whilst their originally chosen toy might be preferred over different toys in the set 
(belonging to the experimenter and puppet), processing in relation to the self may not enhance the 
value of their already-owned exemplar in comparison to a visually and functionally identical copy that 
does not belong to them. Crucially, the findings from this experiment will reveal whether children 
with ASD show reliable preferences for owned items of their choosing, and whether ownership 
enhances the value of such items over-and-above that of an identical replica.   
3. Experiment 2 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 18 verbal children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (14 male; M age = 8.96 
years, range = 6.5–11 years) and 18 TD children (8 male; M age = 5.94 years, range = 5.08–6.75 
years) recruited from two specialist schools and one mainstream school in the Cheshire area. None of 
these children participated in Experiment 1. Samples were closely matched on receptive vocabulary as 
measured by the BPVS (ASD: M age equivalent: 6.31 years, SD: 1.58; TD: M age equivalent: 6.24 
years, SD: 0.63; Dunn et al., 1997). All children with ASD were diagnosed by a qualified educational 
or clinical psychologist, using standardised instruments (i.e. Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale and 
Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised; Lord et al., 2002; Lord et al., 1994) and expert judgement. 
Diagnoses were confirmed via the CARS (Schopler et al., 1980), which was completed by each 
participant’s class teacher (ASD: M score = 33.58; TD: M score = 15.28). Children with ASD were 
significantly older (t(34) = 9.6, p < .001, d = 3.2), and had significantly higher CARS scores (t(34) = 
8.89, p < .001, d = 2.96) than the TD children. The groups did not differ on receptive vocabulary, 
t(34) = 0.16, p = .87. The study was approved by the University Ethics Committee, and informed 
consent was obtained from children’s caregivers prior to their involvement in the research. 
3.1.2. Materials 
Stimuli for the valuation game included the same 9 toys as in Experiment 1, again divided 
into 3 sets of 3 based on monetary value, similarity of size, complexity, and attractiveness (see Figure 
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1). Each participant was presented with the same sets of toys. Stimuli for the warm-up task included 
six objects of varying value and attractiveness (toy dinosaur, toy car, pen, ruler, crumpled piece of 
paper, toilet roll tube). As in Experiment 1, participants interacted with one of two hand puppets that 
resembled humans (“Jack” and “Jill”). Children’s preferences/valuations were indicated via three 
laminated pictures depicting 5 stars, 3 stars, and 1 star respectively. 
3.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in their own schools and were accompanied by a familiar 
adult. Children were verbally praised for attention and good behaviour. Participants completed the 
BPVS in session one, followed by the valuation game in session two on a different day. 
3.1.3.1. Warm-up game. The experimenter presented and verbally labelled three objects – 
one of high desirability (e.g. a realistic toy dinosaur), one of average desirability (e.g. a pen), and one 
of low desirability (e.g. a crumpled piece of paper). The experimenter then presented three laminated 
cards depicting five gold stars, three gold stars, and one gold star respectively (“Here I have 1 star, 
here I have 3 stars, and here I have 5 stars”). They then explained how the star cards represented the 
desirability of the three objects, and assigned them accordingly (“I’m going to give the toy dinosaur 5 
stars because it’s the very best. I’m going to give the pen 3 stars because it’s okay. I’m going to give 
the paper 1 star because it’s the worst”). The experimenter then removed these objects and presented 
and named a new set of three objects that varied in desirability (e.g. a toy car, a colourful ruler, and a 
toilet roll tube). Children were then asked to use the star cards to indicate the desirability of each 
object (“Here you have 1 star, here you have 3 stars, and here you have 5 stars. How many stars for 
the toy car? How many stars for the ruler? How many stars for the toilet roll tube?”). As young 
children do not reliably understand monetary value (Berti & Bombi, 1981), we adopted Bloom et al.’s 
(2016) strategy of using desirability ratings as a proxy for financial valuations. We inferred that 
children understood the rating system if they allocated 5 stars for the car, 3 stars for the ruler, and 1 
star for the toilet roll. If children responded differently, they were provided with corrective feedback 
and asked to try again (e.g. “Actually, I think this one is much better than this one, this should get a 
5…”).  
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3.1.3.2. Valuation game. Participants were introduced to a puppet that matched the child’s 
gender (Jack or Jill). Children were informed that they would play a game and that they would receive 
some toys (“Now we’re going to look at some toys, and at the end you can keep some of them!”). A 
set of 3 toys was placed on the table and children were instructed to select one to keep (“Look at these 
three toys – one, two, three. You can choose one of these toys to keep. Which toy would [child’s 
name] like to take home to keep? [after child’s selection] Here, this toy is yours, this toy is for [child’s 
name]”. The chosen toy was then moved in front of the participant. After the child’s response, one toy 
was then taken by the puppet and the other by the experimenter (e.g. “Sophie is going to keep this toy, 
it’s hers. And Jack/Jill is going to keep this toy, it’s his/hers”), and these toys were moved in front of 
their respective owners. Children were then asked to indicate the desirability of each toy using the star 
cards (“Here you have 1 star, here you have 3 stars, and here you have 5 stars. How many stars for 
[child’s] toy? How many stars for Sophie’s toy? How many stars for Jack/Jill’s toy?”). No feedback 
was provided by the experimenter. After indicating a star card for each toy, children were presented 
with an identical copy of the toy that they chose to keep (“Wow, look at this! It’s just like your toy!”). 
Children were asked to indicate the value of the copy (“How many stars for this toy?”) and offered the 
chance to swap their current toy for it (“Would you like to swap your toy for this toy? Remember, you 
can only keep one of these toys”). The child was then allowed to keep the final toy in their possession. 
This procedure was repeated over 3 trials, each involving a different set of toys (see Figure 1). We 
counterbalanced the order that toy sets were presented, the order in which children were asked to rate 
the three objects in each set, and randomised which toys in each set were selected by the puppet and 
experimenter.  
3.2. Results 
Every child completed all 3 trials. Participants’ desirability ratings (1, 3, 5) for each toy were 
recorded, and they were assigned a trading score of 0-3 corresponding to the number of trials in which 
they swapped their toy for an identical copy. Every child successfully completed the warm-up task on 
their first attempt, with the exception of one child with ASD who required two attempts. 
 Children’s average desirability ratings were entered into a 2(Population: ASD, TD) x 
3(Owner: child, experimenter, puppet) mixed ANOVA (see Figure 3), which revealed a significant 
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main effect of Owner, F(2, 68) = 37.69, MSE = 0.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise 
comparisons showed that children in both populations assigned significantly higher desirability 
ratings to their toys (M = 4.7) than toys belonging to the experimenter (M = 3.33) or puppet (M = 3), 
which did not differ. There was no effect of Population and no interaction. An independent samples t-
test showed that children with ASD swapped their toy for an identical copy significantly more often 
(67% of trials) than TD children (22% of trials), t(34) = 3.69, p < .001, d = 1.23 (see Figure 4). 
Children’s desirability ratings for the toys they chose were compared against the ratings for the 
identical copies via a 2(Population: ASD, TD) x 2(Item: child’s toy, identical copy) mixed ANOVA. 
Significant main effects of Population, F(1, 34) = 36.5, MSE = 0.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .52, and Item, 
F(1, 34) = 52.22, MSE = 0.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, were qualified by a significant Population x Item 
interaction, F(1, 34) = 52.16, MSE = 0.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, which was explored via a series of 
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. While TD children assigned significantly higher 
desirability ratings to their toys (M = 4.67) than the identical copies (M = 2.7), t(17) = 8.06, p < .001, 
d = 2.1, children with ASD almost always rated their toys (M = 4.74) and the identical copies (M = 
4.74) exactly the same (t = 0.01, p = .99). TD children and children with ASD rated their toys very 
similarly (t = .45, p = .66), but the identical copy ratings of children with ASD were significantly 
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Fig. 3. Mean desirability ratings for each item type by children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
and typically developing (TD) children in Experiment 2. Note. Error bars depict SEs.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Mean number of trials in which typically developing (TD) children and children with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) traded their already-owned toy for an identical copy in Experiments 2 and 3. 
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A series of chi-square goodness of fit tests confirmed that there were no preferential selection 
biases for certain toys in either the ASD group (Set A: χ2  = 4, p = .14; Set B: χ2  = 0.33, p = .85; Set C: 
χ2  = 0.33, p = .85) or the TD group (Set A: χ2  = 1, p = .61; Set B: χ2  = 0.33, p = .85; Set C: χ2  = 0.33, 
p = .85). Furthermore, the average desirability ratings for individual objects did not significantly differ 
within each set (Set A: F = .07, p = .94; Set B: F = 1.55, p = .22; Set C: F = .82, p = .09). These 
findings confirm that toys in each set were equally desirable to children in each population. 
3.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 investigated whether children with ASD and TD children regard self-owned 
toys as more valuable than comparable and identical toys they do not own. As anticipated, both 
populations regarded their chosen toys as significantly more valuable than different toys belonging to 
other owners. Also in line with our predictions, TD children rated their already-owned toys as 
significantly more valuable than the non-owned copies, while children with ASD rated the copies just 
as highly as their original toys. In addition, children with ASD swapped their original toy for an 
identical copy significantly more frequently than TD children. These findings advance theoretical 
understanding of ownership by revealing similarities and differences in how TD children and children 
with ASD evaluate property. Children with ASD prefer self-owned items if they are self-selected and 
different from other-owned items (like TD controls), but ownership does not add inherent value to 
their property over-and-above a non-owned copy (unlike for TD controls). 
Although both the TD and ASD groups regarded self-owned toys more favourably than other-
owned toys, their contrasting attitudes towards the identical copies suggest that this preference may be 
driven by different factors. As in Hood and Bloom (2008) and Gelman et al. (2012), the TD children 
considered identical copies to be significantly less valuable than toys they owned. The selection 
process at the start of each trial likely strengthened the child’s connection to their chosen toy, 
conferring “authentic” status. Establishing ownership also caused the original toy to be processed in 
relation to the self, triggering the extension of self-related cognitive biases to the toy (Beggan, 1992; 
Kim & Johnson, 2012, 2015). Hood and colleagues (2016) propose that because children tend to view 
themselves favourably, ownership may result in the transfer of positive self-perceptions to the toy, 
resulting in increased valuation. Indeed, the extent to which TD children and adults over-value their 
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property increases when they are primed to focus on the self rather than others (Hood et al., 2016). By 
comparison, the identical copy lacked any prior connection to the child and may have been devalued 
because it was not intentionally chosen. Despite the copy being visually and functionally identical to 
the child’s toy, thus making it objectively equivalent in attractiveness and desirability, TD children 
may have assigned lower value ratings to resolve cognitive dissonance caused by their bias towards 
their already-owned possession (Egan et al., 2007). Alternatively, TD children may have devalued the 
copy to appear consistent in their beliefs. Having just rated their toy as more valuable than the 
experimenter’s and puppet’s toys, TD children might have devalued the copy to uphold their 
favourable attitude towards their new property.  Overall, our findings for the TD group support the 
theory that ownership adds value to a unique exemplar, making it stand apart from other items of the 
same type. 
In stark contrast, children with ASD considered the identical copy to be just as valuable as the 
toy they owned. This finding aligns with the results from Experiment 1 where mere ownership did not 
bias children with ASD to prefer a randomly endowed toy. Rather, they consistently traded for the toy 
they liked most. Here, children chose their preferred toy at the outset of each trial and, accordingly, 
considered it to be more valuable than non-preferred alternatives. However, ownership of that toy did 
not make it any more valuable than another exemplar with no connection to the self. That is, children 
with ASD regarded identical items to be of very similar value, irrespective of differences in 
ownership. This pattern of responding suggests that property evaluations by children with ASD may 
be increasingly objective, focusing on physical and instrumental qualities as opposed to abstract 
connections to the self or others (e.g. my toy car is exactly the same as Matt’s toy car; I like them both 
equally because they do not differ in appearance or functionality). These results also provide novel 
evidence that children with ASD do not automatically devalue non-selected items in comparison to 
chosen items of equal desirability (indicating the absence of a mechanism that has been observed 
across cultures, ages, and species; Egan et al., 2007). It may be that deficits in social-cognition and 
mental state reasoning cause children with ASD to be relatively unconcerned about presenting 
consistent attitudes to others (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995), therefore reducing their motivation to uphold 
the belief that their original toy is the most valuable. 
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Based on the current data, it is impossible to discriminate whether TD children’s heightened 
valuation of self-owned property was elicited by mere ownership or preferences for individual toys. 
Allowing them to choose a toy from a set resulted in them consistently owning the item they liked 
most (blending the two influences). Therefore, the objective of Experiment 3 was to elucidate whether 
ownership reliably increases children’s valuations of self-owned items, regardless of preferences for 
specific toys. We employed the same paradigm as in Experiment 2, with one crucial exception: the 
child’s toy was allocated at random. As in Experiment 1, there was a 1 in 3 chance of children 
receiving the toy they liked the most. Consequently, if valuation ratings are based on preferences for 
individual toys, there should be no differences between average valuation ratings for each owner (i.e. 
across children and trials, favourite toys would be allocated to the child, puppet, and experimenter on 
33% of trials respectively). If, however, mere ownership influences children’s preferences – 
irrespective of what the toy is – we should observe differences in valuation ratings for self- and other-
owned property.  
Based on previous evidence (e.g. Gelman et al., 2012), plus the results of Experiments 1 and 
2, we predicted that mere ownership would bias TD children to assign higher valuations to their 
randomly endowed toys than comparable toys belonging to others. We also expected them to under-
value identical copies and trade infrequently. On the other hand, we anticipated that the valuation 
ratings of children with ASD would be more objective, assigning the highest ratings to toys they like 
most irrespective of ownership. Importantly, observing these between-population differences would 
both confirm that mere ownership irrationally biases the preferences of TD children and support our 
theory that children with ASD are significantly less susceptible to mere ownership effects.  
4. Experiment 3 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 15 verbal children with ASD (12 male; M age = 8.97 years, range = 6.5–11 
years) and 15 TD controls (7 male; M age = 5.86 years, range = 5.08–6.75 years) that all participated 
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in Experiment 2.1 Samples were closely matched on receptive vocabulary as measured by the BPVS 
(ASD: M age equivalent: 6.3 years, SD: 1.49; TD: M age equivalent: 6.21 years, SD: 0.59; Dunn et al., 
1997). Children with ASD were significantly older (t(28) = 8.6, p < .001, d = 3.14), and had 
significantly higher CARS scores (t(28) = 7.41, p < .001, d = 2.71) than the TD children (ASD: M 
CARS score = 33.17; TD: M CARS score = 15.33). The groups did not differ on receptive 
vocabulary, t(28) = 0.22, p = .83. The study was approved by the University Ethics Committee, and 
informed consent was obtained from children’s caregivers prior to their involvement in the research. 
4.1.2. Materials 
Stimuli included a different set of 9 toys divided into 3 sets of 3 based on monetary value, 
similarity of size, complexity, and attractiveness (see Figure 1), 6 warm-up objects of varying value 
and attractiveness (teddy bear, toy truck, notebook, rubber, paperclip, bottle lid), two human-looking 
hand puppets, and three laminated cards depicting 5 stars, 3 stars, and 1 star. 
4.1.3. Procedure 
The warm-up task was exactly as described in Experiment 1 (using different objects). The 
valuation game was also identical except for how toys were assigned to participants. Rather than 
allowing children to choose which toy they would like to keep, they were instead allocated a toy by 
the experimenter (“Look at these three toys – one, two, three. This toy is yours, this toy is for [child’s 
name]. [child’s name] can take this toy home to keep, it’s yours.”). This toy was then moved in front 
of the participant. The experimenter and puppet then each claimed a toy, and these were moved in 
front of their respective owners. Children then indicated the desirability of the three objects using the 
star cards as described above. Children were then presented with an identical copy of their toy, which 
they were asked to value. They were also offered the chance to trade their already-owned toy for the 
copy. This procedure was repeated over 3 trials, each involving a different set of toys (see Figure 1). 
We counterbalanced the order that toy sets were presented, which toy in each set was allocated to the 
participant, which toys in each set were selected by the experimenter and puppet, and the order in 
which children were asked to rate the three objects in each set. 
                                                          
1 Three children with ASD who participated in Experiment 2 were unavailable to participate in Experiment 3. 
To balance the sample sizes, three TD children with the most similar BPVS scores were also excluded.  
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4.2. Results 
Every child completed all 3 trials. As in Experiment 2, participants’ desirability ratings (1, 3, 
5) for each toy were recorded, and they were assigned a trading score of 0-3 corresponding to the 
number of trials in which they swapped their toy for an identical copy. Every child successfully 
completed the warm-up task on their first attempt. 
Children’s average desirability ratings were entered into a 2(Population: ASD, TD) x 
3(Owner: child, experimenter, puppet) mixed ANOVA (see Figure 5). The results revealed a 
significant main effect of Owner, F(2, 56) = 16.13, MSE = 0.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, which was 
qualified by a significant Population x Owner interaction, F(2, 56) = 6.09, MSE = 0.8, p = .004, ηp2 = 
.18. This interaction was investigated via a series of Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons. The 
desirability ratings of children with ASD and TD children did not statistically differ for their 
randomly allocated toys (ASD M: 4.11; TD M: 4.56; t = 1.8, p = .08) or the experimenter’s toys (ASD 
M: 3.27; TD M: 3.44; t = 0.41, p = .68). However, children with ASD assigned significantly higher 
ratings to the puppet’s toys than TD children (ASD M: 3.62; TD M: 2.56; t(28) = 2.41, p = .023, d = 
0.88). For children with ASD, there were no statistically significant differences between desirability 
ratings for toys belonging to them, the experimenter, or the puppet (p = .18-.54). By contrast, TD 
children assigned significantly higher ratings to their toy than the experimenter’s toy (p = .012) and 
the puppet’s toy (p < .001). Irrespective of ownership status, the average desirability ratings for 
individual toys did not significantly differ within each set (Set D: F = 1.87, p = .16; Set E: F = 2.67, p 
OWNERSHIP EFFECT IN ASD  24 
 
= .09; Set F: F = 0.29, p = .75). 
 
Fig. 5. Mean desirability ratings for each item type by children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
and typically developing (TD) children in Experiment 3. Note. Error bars depict SEs.  
 
As in Experiment 2, an independent samples t-test showed that children with ASD swapped 
their toy for an identical copy significantly more often (82% of trials) than TD children (23% of 
trials), t(28) = 5.43, p < .001, d = 1.98 (see Figure 4). Children’s desirability ratings for their 
randomly allocated toys were compared against the ratings for the identical copies via a 2(Population: 
ASD, TD) x 2(Item: child’s toy, identical copy) mixed ANOVA. Significant main effects of 
Population, F(1, 28) = 7.26, MSE = 0.8, p = .012, ηp2 = .21, and Item, F(1, 28) = 18.38, MSE = 0.47, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .4, were qualified by a significant Population x Item interaction, F(1, 28) = 36.66, 
MSE = 0.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .57, which was assessed via a series of Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise 
comparisons. Children with ASD again rated their toys (M = 4.11) and the identical copies (M = 4.42) 
similarly (t = 1.53, p = .15), whereas TD children assigned significantly higher ratings to their toys (M 
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the identical copies significantly more favourably than TD children, t(28) = 5.13, p < .001, d = 1.88, 
but ratings for their toys did not statistically differ (t = 1.8, p = .08).  
4.3. Discussion 
Informed by our previous results, Experiment 3 tested whether mere ownership causes TD 
children and children with ASD to over-value random toys relative to non-owned toys (that were 
potentially preferred) and identical copies. As in Experiment 2, TD children assigned significantly 
higher ratings to self-owned toys than other-owned toys and identical copies (which were rarely 
traded for). For children with ASD, there were no statistically significant differences between 
valuations across the three owners. Thus, mere ownership did not reliably increase the value of their 
randomly endowed property. We again observed that children with ASD were keen to swap for 
identical copies which were regarded to be of similar value to their already-owned toys. Alongside 
Experiments 1 and 2, these findings show that mere ownership reliably influences the property 
valuations of TD children, but not children with ASD. 
Despite there being a 67% probability of not receiving their favoured toy in a set, TD children 
consistently rated their randomly allocated toys as the most valuable. This striking behaviour supports 
the theory that mere ownership can elicit favourable biases towards certain objects, even overriding 
initial preferences for other items. The fact that identical non-owned copies were regarded as 
significantly less valuable than already-owned toys again shows that children’s heightened 
preferences were restricted to their unique exemplars, and did not extend to object categories (see 
Gelman et al., 2012). Viewed beside the results of Experiments 1 and 2, these findings suggest that 
TD children’s preferences and valuations for property are more strongly influenced by abstract 
ownership connections to people than material qualities (e.g. an object’s appearance and function). 
This illustrates just how powerful an influence ownership has on the psychology of young children in 
Western cultures.   
By contrast, ownership appears to have little influence on how children with ASD evaluate 
property. For these children, merely owning an object does not necessarily make it more valuable than 
other objects, or identical copies, belonging to others. Rather, the preferences and valuations of 
children with ASD appear to be dependent on what a toy is, rather than whom it belongs to. Hence, it 
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would seem that the judgements of children with ASD are actually more rational in economic terms 
than those of TD individuals. These results strongly support our hypothesis that ASD impacts 
fundamental cognitive mechanisms that cause ownership to have such a significant influence on our 
individual and social psychological existence.     
5. General Discussion 
This study was the first to investigate whether children with ASD prefer and over-value 
property due to mere ownership. Our findings across three experiments reveal that, for children with 
ASD, ownership alone does not elicit heightened valuation and preferences for one’s own property. In 
Experiment 1, we discovered that children with ASD did not reliably favour a randomly endowed toy 
and frequently traded for a different object that they preferred. By contrast, TD children showed a 
clear preference for their randomly endowed toy and traded infrequently. Both populations also 
demonstrated highly-accurate tracking of owner-object relationships. Experiment 2 showed that both 
TD children and children with ASD over-value their toys if they are self-selected and different from 
other-owned toys. However, unlike TD children, children with ASD did not over-value their toys in 
comparison to non-owned identical copies. This finding was replicated in Experiment 3, which also 
established that mere ownership was sufficient to elicit over-valuation of randomly endowed property 
(in comparison to other-owned property) in TD children. However, children with ASD did not 
consistently regard their randomly endowed toys as the most valuable, and evaluated property 
irrespective of ownership. Taken together, these results strongly indicate that ASD may suppress one 
of the most powerful and reliable phenomena in psychology and economics (Loewenstein & 
Issacharoff, 1994).  
In Western cultures, there is a strong connection between ownership and personal identity; we 
evaluate ourselves and others based on property (Belk, 1985, 1991, 2000; Cunningham et al., 2013; 
James, 1890; Kahneman et al., 1991). A vast literature spanning psychology, philosophy, and 
economics argues that ownership is so influential because we assimilate property into our extended 
self-concept – who we are is affected by what we own (Belk, 1988; Csikszentimihalyi & Rochberg-
Halton, 1981; Diesendruck & Perez, 2015; Sartre, 1956). Establishing ownership forges a mentalisic 
connection between the self and a property item, transforming the item into a physical marker of our 
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personal identity (Belk, 1988; Sartre, 1956). Consequently, self-related cognitive biases are 
transferred to our property, causing us to perceive self-owned items to be of higher value and 
desirability than other items, including identical exemplars, which do not belong to us (Diesendruck 
& Perez, 2015; Hood et al., 2016). The responses of our TD participants across all three experiments 
strongly align with this theoretical perspective, and support prior evidence that children reliably, and 
sometimes irrationally, over-value objects merely due to ownership-induced connections to the self 
(Hood & Bloom, 2008; Hood et al., 2016; Gelman et al., 2012). Furthermore, the TD children’s 
ratings for identical copies replicate prior evidence for devaluation of objects that have not been 
intentionally chosen in comparison to those that have (Egan et al., 2007). In our experiments, this 
mechanism may serve to resolve cognitive dissonance caused by children’s bias towards one 
exemplar in a pair of identical objects (with objectively equal desirability), or to maintain consistency 
in their belief that their property is the most valuable.  
Conversely, mere ownership does not elicit irrational biases in children with ASD. This 
population only displayed reliable preferences for self-owned property that they chose, and thus 
subjectively preferred, in comparison to different alternatives. The fact that children with ASD 
ascribed very similar values to identical copies of these items confirms that ownership does not confer 
special value to a particular exemplar. This behaviour also indicates that, unlike TD children, children 
with ASD do not automatically devalue non-selected items in comparison to chosen items of equal 
desirability (Egan et al., 2007). We argue that profound deficits in self-understanding and self-concept 
development may diminish the advantageous effects of ownership in children with ASD (Frith, 2003; 
Grisdale et al., 2012; Lind, 2010). If one’s psychological sense of self is impaired, or their extended 
self-concept is under-developed, it follows that processing external objects in relation to the self 
would have little bearing on their perceived value. Consequently, children with ASD seem relatively 
unconcerned with who an item belongs to when communicating preferences and valuations. Rather, 
their judgements may be driven primarily by what an object is and does. This suggests that ownership 
understanding in ASD is incongruent with the essentialist view that an item’s value can be radically 
influenced by “invisible” qualities connected to its history (see Bloom & Gelman, 2008). For 
example, collectors of celebrity memorabilia are willing to pay extraordinary amounts for mundane 
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items that were owned or used by famous individuals (e.g. a lock of pop singer Justin Bieber’s hair 
sold for $40,668 on EBay in 2011; BBC, 2011). It would be interesting to investigate whether 
individuals with ASD experience a desire to own “authentic” items of this nature. Furthermore, 
additional research is required to identify specific historical and material factors that reliably influence 
property valuations of children with ASD.  
An alternative possibility is that the absence of ownership effects in the ASD group was 
related to diagnosis-defining deficits in social interaction (APA, 2013). It has been argued that 
ownership effects are associated with the importance of individualism, consumerism, and materialism 
at a cultural level (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen., 2012; Gao, Wheeler, & Shiv, 2009; 
Morrison & Johnson, 2011; Newman et al., 2011). Thus, it may be that impairments in social-
cognition and social motivation inhibit children with ASD (APA, 2013; Chevallier et al., 2012) from 
acquiring these values through engagement with their culture. As a result, the cognitive influence of 
ownership on Western children with ASD may resemble that observed in non-Western TD cultures 
that prioritise collectivist values (Gjersoe, Newman, Chituc, & Hood, 2014; Sparks et al., 2016). 
Gjersoe et al. (2014) report that Indian adults consider objects associated with famous individuals to 
be less valuable than American adults (but do not differ when valuing objects based on material 
properties), while Sparks et al. (2016) found that ownership does not influence recognition memory in 
Asian adults. However, this theory is weakened by recent evidence that Western TD children aged 2-4 
years display ownership effects despite being too young to recognise or understand materialistic 
values (Hood et al., 2016; Gelman et al., 2012). This evidence suggests that lack of cultural 
knowledge or awareness cannot sufficiently explain the absence of ownership effects in Western 
children with ASD. Nevertheless, social deficits in ASD may impact ownership understanding in 
other ways. Although our ASD group demonstrated highly-accurate tracking of owner-object 
relationships in Experiment 1, correct responding could have been underpinned by sensitivity to 
possession-based statistics. We recommend that future research explore whether children with ASD 
differ in their awareness and use of ownership heuristics that are not based on observing possession, 
particularly social-cultural stereotypes relating to age and gender.  
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Of course, we must address the limitations of this study. It is possible that the observed 
between-group differences are an effect of limited cognitive abilities rather than autism per se. We 
acknowledge that including a sample of children with major learning difficulties matched to children 
with ASD on non-verbal intelligence would have eliminated this issue. As we propose that differences 
in responding between children with ASD and TD children are linked to differences in self-
understanding, this study would have benefited from a specific measure of this ability. Despite the 
fact that the varied deficits in self-understanding in ASD are robust and well-documented (see Lind, 
2010), our theoretical explanations require validation in future research. Finally, it is important to 
clarify an aspect of our argument. We acknowledge that children with ASD do form strong 
attachments to certain possessions (particularly if those objects are involved in stereotypic routines), 
however, our evidence suggests that mere ownership does not confer privileged status to new 
possessions (as it does for TD children and adults). 
6. Conclusions 
Our study was the first to explore whether children with ASD display mere ownership effects. 
Our results advance the ownership literature by demonstrating that children with ASD do not prefer or 
over-value property due to mere ownership. We propose that deficits in self-understanding may 
diminish ownership effects in ASD, eliciting a more economically-rational perspective that prioritises 
material qualities (e.g. what a toy is) rather than whom it belongs to. By contrast, our TD participants 
preferred and over-valued random objects due to ownership. These findings support prior evidence by 
indicating that favourable biases are conferred to one’s own property due to processing items in 
relation to the self. Overall, this study has provided novel insight into how children’s thinking and 
behaviour towards self-owned property is influenced by ASD and highlights important directions for 
future research.    
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